Conclusion: Rethinking African Governance and Development by Crook, Richard C. & Booth, David
Rethinking African governance in a development
perspective is no small challenge. The research
reported in this IDS Bulletin seeks to illuminate
what we consider one of the great issues of our
time. We offer this contribution with all due
modesty, and as work in progress, with a view to
stimulating the debate we believe to be urgently
needed.
As explained in the Introduction, current research
within the Africa Power and Politics Programme
(APPP) is addressing the question of ‘what works?’
and pursuing the idea of ‘going with the grain’ in
half-a-dozen fields of governance for development.
The articles included cover no more than half of
the topics and only a fraction of the countries
within the scope of the programme. They report
initial findings from empirical research, which is
continuing, and draw on processes of reflection
which are in important respects still maturing.
As the articles show, however, it is not too soon to
identify some important propositions behind
which there are already solid arguments and
ample evidence. We invite fellow researchers and
policy practitioners to engage with us on these
emerging findings. We challenge them to join us
in debating the implications for development
actors and for the future of Africa.
Our most important insights concern what kinds
of governance work better to support the
provision of the public goods that are essential to
sustained and inclusive development. They are
built on comparative analysis of the empirical
findings from case studies of governance at three
levels: local, sectoral and national.
The studies of local governance were all framed
by a rigorous attempt to understand why a
particular set of public goods (safe birthing,
public security, public cleansing and sanitation
and local markets) are delivered more
successfully in some settings or places than in
others. In each area of provision, the focus was on
institutional configurations and their relationship
to local forms of collective action, or what we
term ‘local problem-solving’. In most cases,
service delivery was dependent on some kind of
‘co-production’ or multi-agency, multi-actor
collaboration, with contributions from a range of
state, social, private and international agencies
(see Olivier de Sardan’s ‘The Eight Modes of
Local Governance…’, this IDS Bulletin).
One of the most powerful explanations of why
public goods were provided relatively successfully
in some places is the presence of forms of local
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problems facing communities in their own ways.
They work because they are locally anchored in
established forms of social obligation which can
sustain contributions to the public interest and
thus mitigate the free-rider problem which
undermines so many attempts at collective
action. Thus, traders’ associations in Sierra
Leone were able to organise the contributions to
waste management without which the City
Council service could not have operated – and
were able to prevent free-riding through their
ability to collectively sanction members. In Niger,
groups as diverse as bus owners’ unions, cattle
brokers, youth associations, health-user
committees and savings groups have played key
roles in providing resources to facilitate public
security, waste management and maternal
health services. In Malawi, by contrast, attempts
to reduce maternal mortality by banning
traditional birth attendants (TBAs) and
encouraging women to attend modern clinics are
failing because insufficient account has been
taken of local beliefs and attitudes. There has
been no action to spread the message or support
the policy. The TBAs themselves have not been
brought on board but continue as a counter-
force, undermining official policy.
It is important, however, to distinguish these
findings from what is now a conventional wisdom
of development policy; the idea that better
governance requires the funding and
encouragement of ‘associational’ life (sometimes
termed ‘building civil society’). As the country
studies show, co-production is not easily
facilitated by donor-funded and inspired
committees or associations conceived as formal
advocacy groups in the ‘Northern’ mode, or as
co-managers. Even democratic participation,
seen as a way of arousing citizen demand for
better public services, emerges from our research
as a weak force at best.
The local forms of collective action which worked
did not involve accountability to an abstract
‘public’, and did not conform to any formal
financial accounting standards. The actors were
more often than not quite restricted interest
groups, with an incentive, i.e. a pay-off, for what
they were doing, and an ability to draw upon
local forms of solidarity. Their actions seldom
involved ‘demanding’ better public services or
greater accountability. Local participation in
security issues, for instance, was often focused on
goals and methods which would not be supported
by a donor development agency, with pay-offs
linked to an informal semi-privatisation of
services. And the impact of multi-party
competition on market management in Malawi
was simply to undermine the local legitimacy
and effectiveness of the formerly respected
community-based market traders’ committee.
A second key explanatory factor to emerge from
the comparative analysis concerns the extent to
which there is administrative coordination and
policy coherence among the multiple agencies
and actors involved. In Niger, for instance, the
delivery of security by the gendarmerie was a
function of coordination among the gendarmes
themselves, the Prefect, private security
agencies, youth militias providing
Neighbourhood Watch, mayors and chiefs. And
emergency maternity care has benefited from a
very local coordination among clinic managers
and users, local authorities and development
projects. But conflicts of jurisdiction and lines of
accountability, together with multiple funding
sources made the delivery of some services
extremely difficult, as it does in so many other
settings in Africa. In Malawi, maternal health
was affected by a basic failure to anticipate how
the policy reform was likely to play out in
practice. As Olivier de Sardan reminds us,
ensuring the needed coordination is not easy in
the general absence of strong central
government agencies and other overarching
authorities. Being dependent on informal
arrangements and the ‘good will’ not just of
social actors but also of officials in state and local
government positions and donor projects makes
coordination haphazard and fragile.
Such problems are linked to a third key element
in the successful provision of public goods: the
presence of authorities capable of imposing rule
enforcement and discipline within public
organisations and among service providers. To
have a generalised effect, this must stem from
the national political system. Our comparative
analysis of neo-patrimonial regimes, discussed
below, says something about the conditions
under which this is likely. But the necessary
discipline may not have to come from central
government agencies if other public or collective
‘authorities’ are present locally. In Sierra Leone,
sanctions to enforce the behaviour required to
sustain public cleanliness of the market were
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provided largely through associational ‘self-
regulation’. In contrast, the provision of clean
meat was not assured because self-regulation
could not make up for the absence of any will or
capacity to enforce regulations on the part of the
City Council or higher government authorities.
The latter failure was linked to the perverse
effects of donor-driven funding incentives.
Malawi presents an even stronger set of
contrasting examples, where on the one hand
security provision was improved through the
exercise of strong authority by the
administration and the police in collaboration
with local government and local associations,
while market management faltered because of
conflicts over authority to regulate and enforce,
caused by party-politicisation.
Some of the explanatory factors from the local
governance work also feature in APPP’s sectoral
studies of forestry services, educational reform,
cotton marketing and local justice. Only the
justice study, focused on dispute settlement
institutions (DSIs) in Ghana, has been presented
in this collection. This concerns the provision of
a fundamental public good (legitimate and
accessible justice) by state agencies, or those
supported by the state, at the local level. Two
aspects of the findings are worth emphasising
here.
First, the ability to be responsive to local cultures
– i.e. anchor ways of settling disputes in local
concepts of fairness – was found to be an
important dimension of the provision of justice
by the three DSIs in Ghana. However, this ability
was a function of the discipline and coordination
to which they were subject as instances of
national organisations. This may seem
paradoxical, but the legitimacy and popularity of
the magistrate’s courts and the CHRAJ district
mediations were linked in a very material way to
their being part of well-established and
autonomous state bodies. The professionalism
and commitment of their staff underpinned their
reputation for neutrality. And their ability to
offer enforceable and/or authoritative remedies
also derived from the power of the state, as
articulated through the Judicial Service and the
national organisation of the CHRAJ. The
Customary Land Secretariats, on the other hand,
suffered from a lack of clarity over what
procedures or codes to follow and because of
their ‘traditional’ character were actually more
likely to be formalistic and less attuned to local
values. And because they were embedded in local
political hierarchies and power struggles, they
were less likely to be seen as impartial – the key
feature of local beliefs about justice.
Second, the flexibility of the way the more
successful DSIs worked may be attributed to
their ‘hybridity’; they combined commitment to
certain formal laws, procedures and codes with
practices which responded to their local
situations: the use of local languages, informal
discourses and codes, which enabled individual
officers to deal with the realities of life as
presented to their institutions on a daily basis.
These informal behaviours, however, were always
framed within the core disciplines imposed by
their organisation. These organisations indeed
authorised some of their experiments with
informality through the new court-attached
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) system
and of course the whole ADR approach of the
CHRAJ district mediators. This is something
echoed in other APPP research findings at the
sector level, as well as in some of the local
governance work. Successful managers of under-
resourced public services adapt to local life while
retaining their core mission and authority.
The policy implications of these findings are very
strong, although not necessarily easy to accept.
International organisations, donors and NGOs
should support authoritative coordination and
the pursuit of policy coherence by African
governments, and avoid the conflicts of
jurisdiction and operational philosophy which
frequently emerge from separately funded
initiatives and changing global priorities.
Associations and committees created according
to funders’ blueprints should be avoided in the
interests of genuine collective action. Greater
recognition is needed that ‘what works’ may be
rooted in very localised and complex ways of
doing things which coexist within forms of
governance which, out of necessity, are
informalised and penetrated by local
arrangements and pay-offs, deals and political
clientelism. In these senses, the governance
arrangements that support development best at
the local level may not resemble any current
notions of ‘good governance’. This is not to say
that anything goes. On the contrary, a key
ingredient of success, when an effective way has
been found to deliver a particular public good, is
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a minimum of rule enforcement within and on
the part of provider organisations. This may be
achieved by self-regulation if and when the
providers themselves have some corporate
discipline, as in the case of the transport unions.
Otherwise, it will depend on the extent to which
vertical coordination is supported politically at
the national level.
At the national level, as at the sectoral and local
levels, what works does not seem to be ‘good
governance’ as is currently understood. Our
comparative work on neo-patrimonial regimes
shows very clearly that it is possible for a
government to pursue successful developmental
policies within a political system which operates
primarily on the basis of patron–client relations
and thus ‘goes with the grain’ of the dominant
mode of state–society interaction.
The articles included in this IDS Bulletin propose
a preliminary theory for categorising and
explaining the differences among neo-
patrimonial regimes. How is it that in some
states ‘patronage politics’ seems to produce only
predation and economic collapse, while in others
the outcomes justify the use of the term
‘developmental patrimonialism’? Kelsall suggests
that the key factors are a combination of the
extent to which rent extraction is centralised
under the control of the ruler, and the extent to
which the capital generated by such rental
extraction is invested in more long-term,
productive projects or enterprises. The most
benign combination occurs when there is fully
centralised rent control under a unified elite,
and long-horizon investment of rents.
Developmental outcomes follow because such a
regime demands and sustains a competent public
service which is vertically disciplined (with
authority ultimately derived from the political
regime) but also given sufficient autonomy to
manage and implement development policies – it
therefore has ‘bureaucratic integrity’.
Examples of such regimes in Africa include Côte
d’Ivoire under President Houphouet-Boigny until
the late 1970s, Botswana, Kenyatta’s Kenya,
Rwanda since 2000 and the case examined in
detail here, Malawi under President Banda up to
1979 and under President Mutharika until 2009.
The Malawi material illustrates very powerfully
the way in which changes in these combinations
of factors affected developmental outcomes over
a period of 45 years. The impact of multi-party
politics was particularly striking in the context of
a weak regime struggling to establish control;
short-termism, an explosion of corruption and a
collapse in civil service morale and discipline led
to real declines in policymaking capacity and a
severe deterioration in economic performance.
Yet this was neither permanent nor an inevitable
consequence of ‘democracy’ as such; the
emergence of a more powerful centralising
political regime under Mutharika enabled some
rebuilding of the technocracy and policy capacity
with consequent improvements in outcomes.
What Malawi also shows us, however, is that even
the most developmental regimes in this model
may bear little relation to what might be termed
‘good governance’. Even although Banda was
tough on corruption, the patronage system
enabled the emergence of a powerful group of
party loyalists and civil servants who became
successful business entrepreneurs through the
policy of encouraging estate agriculture. Banda’s
own company, Press Holdings, became a major
conglomerate which came to play an important –
and effective – role in the economic strategy.
Thus, patronage remained at the core of a
system of state–business relations which did
create some successful developmental outcomes.
This increased prosperity was translated into
better public services for the population because
of the effectively disciplined public bureaucracy.
This theoretical distinction between
developmental and predatory neo-patrimonialism
builds on and modifies previous ‘developmental
state’ models. Over a decade ago, Peter Evans
posed the question of whether it was possible to
envisage developmental states of the East Asian
type emerging in other poor countries such as
those of sub-Saharan Africa, but without resorting
to a naive voluntarism about how policymakers
could help to ‘construct’ such states (Evans 1998).
It is now evident that the real problem is to
understand the conditions under which certain
kinds of political regime are likely to generate
developmental technocracies, given that the East
Asian – and to a lesser extent South-East Asian –
stories were so specific to their place and time
context. Our model suggests that a theory centred
on autonomous state bureaucracies embedded in
business networks does not travel well to the
African context. Successful African regimes seem
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to have created their own business and investment
economies through the logic of a state-driven
demand for long-term returns to patronage-based
enterprises. And to ensure this, they demand not
autonomous ‘Weberian’ bureaucracies, but
bureaucracies that are competent and disciplined,
yet dedicated to implementing the projects of the
political elite.
Whether such regimes can be promoted or built
through deliberate policy action requires further
discussion. In the present era, it is politically
difficult for Northern donors to support what
might be termed benign despotisms, even in the
shape of dominant party regimes masquerading
as multi-party democracies. Yet the evidence for
Africa suggests that the expected longevity of a
regime, when combined with the characteristics
of a developmental patrimonialism, is an under-
appreciated factor working in favour of what is
known in the aid business as ‘country-owned
development effort’. Certainly, it is hard to
visualise equivalent results being generated
under systems of competitive democracy in
which incumbents face the actuality or risk of
loss of office at frequent intervals, powerfully
incentivising them to engage in short-term
pillage of public resources. In any case,
development agencies have to work with the
realities of country governance as they find them
– experience does not suggest that
developmental governance can be purchased
with funding and conditionalities. That being the
case, our analysis may at least provide a more
convincing rationale for some of the things that
donors are already doing for pragmatic reasons
in some countries.
Overall, our research is suggesting that the
institutions most likely to contribute to
development in low-income Africa are ‘practical
hybrids’, combining the authoritative
coordination which can come from a
developmental neo-patrimonial state with an
enabling environment for local problem-solving
and a constructive use of culturally legitimate
ways of working. This contrasts sharply with
conventional ‘good governance’. It also
represents a significant departure from the
Evans concept of the developmental state in
giving less emphasis to bureaucratic autonomy,
more prominence to differences among political
regime types and a much more encompassing
role to social embeddedness.
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